all mechanistic causation is banished from biology equally lightly, without argument, without a word to indicate that the author is aware that he is here attacking the foundations of all science, his treatment of this momentous topic appears positively light-minded. We may note that when of any process it is said that it is necessary to the maintenance, or to the welfare, of the whole organism, that is one of those lower forms of non-dynamic interpretation which we noticed in our discussion of explanation and causation, a kind of interpretation which, though valid and necessary, can be, I submit, only provisional When such interpretation is clearly established, when we have recognized the unity and wholeness of the organism in the fullest possible manner the need for dynamic or causal explanation, mechanistic or teleological, will still be felt; we shall rightly continue to seek it, to devise causal explanatory hypotheses.

Like Hitter, Goldstein is strong on the critical side; and some of his critical rejections are very radical. For example, instead of accepting the reflex sensory-motor arcs and reflex actions, as studied in muiticellular animals, as the units of which all cerebral organization and activity are composed by additive complication, he rejects them completely as artefacts that have no place in the normal functioning of the organism. And the claim of Pavlov's conditioned reflexes to be the type and substance of all adaptive action is *a fortiori* repudiated. Far from regarding them as of [c] profound philosophical importance *,

he looks upon the conditioned reflex as a red herring which has hindered progress; he denounces all reflexology and pillories it, alongside modern genetics, as the most striking examples of the errors that flow from "isolating procedures' and purely additive thinking.